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EMPLOYMENT

DISCRIMINATION-TITLE

VII

ACT-AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT

OF

1964

CIVIL RIGHTS

AcT-The Court of Ap-

peals for the Third Circuit has held that the "240-day" rule for
filing a discrimination action with the EEOC in a deferral state
applies to Title VII actions, but has no application with respect to
ADEA actions. The Third Circuit has further held that the question of fraud in a settlement agreement involving rights under federal anti-discrimination statutes constitutes a federal question.
Seredinski v. Clifton Precision Products Co., 776 F.2d 56 (3d Cir.
1985).
Louise Seredinski had worked at Clifton Precision Products
Company (Clifton) since 1956 and had been gradually promoted to
the position of production supervisor.1 On February 19, 1982, she
was removed from that position and placed in the Customer Services Department.2 Seredinski filed a sex and age discrimination
complaint with the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission
(PHRC) on March 16, 1982, which was then settled by an agreement signed by all parties on April 20, 1982.1
On November 17, 1982,' Clifton informed Seredinski that her
pay would be reduced to bring it in line with the salaries of other
Customer Service staff." For this reason, Seredinski filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) on August 24, 1983, alleging retaliation due to her prior
discrimination charge. 6 After completing its investigation, the
EEOC gave Seredinski a Notice of Right to Sue.
In her complaint, filed in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on February 17, 1984,"
1. Seredinski v. Clifton Precision Products Co., 776 F.2d 56, 58 (3d Cir. 1985).
2. Id. Seredinski, who was over forty, was replaced by a younger male employee. Id.
3. The charge was referred to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC), but the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission settled the matter before the

EEOC could act. Id.
4. Id. at 58 n.1. The date when Seredinski learned of the pay reduction is unclear. As
the case involves a motion to dismiss, the latest possible date is used. Id.
5. Id. at 58. Seredinski had her pay reduced from $12.63 per hour to $7.75 per hour
between November 29, 1982 and April 4, 1983. Id.
6. Id. Whether the EEOC deferred the charge to the PHRC is unclear. Seredinski did
not file with the PHRC. Id.
7. Id.
8. Seredinski v. Clifton Precision Products, No. 84-804, Mem. Op. (E.D. Pa. Sept. 6,
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Seredinski alleged violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (Title VII), a the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA)' 0 and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act." Specifically, she alleged that her initial change of job assignment was discriminatory and that her subsequent pay reduction constituted unlawful retaliation. 12 She also claimed breach of the April 12, 1982
settlement agreement and had several claims under state law.'$
After Clifton filed a motion to dismiss,"' but before her response,
Seredinski amended her complaint to include a claim of fraud in
the inducement of the settlement agreement. 15 As part of her relief, Seredinski sought to have the agreement voided and the
March, 1982 complaint considered as if the agreement had not
been made.16
Seredinski's complaint was dismissed on September 6, 1984.'1
The district court held that the Title VII and ADEA claims were
time-barred and that the fraudulent inducement claim arose under
state law.' 8 As for any state claims, the court declined to exercise
jurisdiction. 9 Seredinski filed an appeal with the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.20 Writing for the Third
Circuit, Judge Higginbotham first addressed Seredinski's claim
1984).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), (d)(1982).
10. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a), (d)(1982).
11. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 956 (Purdon 1964, Supp. 1986).
12. Seredinski, 776 F.2d at 58.
13. Id. At the district court level, she claimed breach of the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing, as well as intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. These state claims are
not at issue here. See Murray v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 782 F.2d 432 (3d Cir. 1986)(no
recovery for age discrimination under state contract law; Pennsylvania Human Relations
Act provides the exclusive remedy); Hooten v. Pennsylvania College of Optometry, 601 F.
Supp. 1151(E.D. Pa. 1984)(no recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress in discrimination cases, except for sexual harassment); Shaffer v. Nat'l Can Corp., 565 F. Supp.
909 (E.D. Pa. 1983)(sexual harassment complainant has a state claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress).
14. 776 F.2d at 59. The motion for dismissal was based on the fact that the Title VII
and ADEA claims were time-barred and on a request that the district court not exercise
jurisdiction over state claims. Id.
15. Id. Seredinski alleged that Clifton's representations that there would be no salary
cut induced her to sign the April 20, 1982 settlement agreement. Id.
16. Id. That is, she wanted the court to consider the issues in the March, 1982 discrimination charge as if the PHRC and EEOC administrative proceedings had not been
terminated by the agreement. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 57.
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that the settlement agreement was fraudulently induced." Judge
Higginbotham reasoned that the district court had misconstrued
Seredinski's claim as a mere attempt to enforce a contract.22 Instead, according to the Third Circuit, Seredinski was seeking to
void her settlement agreement and reinstate her Title VII and
ADEA claims."
According to Judge Higginbotham, the correct rule of decision
24
was to be found in Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R.,
wherein the United States Supreme Court determined that the
question of fraud in a settlement agreement involving federal
rights is a federal question. 25 State law, therefore, could not determine whether the claims covered by the 1982 settlement agreement
would be reinstated.26
As to whether the Title VII retaliation claim was time-barred,
the Third Circuit affirmed the district court's decision that it
was.27 Judge Higginbotham noted that, in accordance with Love v.
Pullman,2 either the EEOC or the complainant may refer the
complaint to the state agency in a deferral state2 9 such as
21. Id. at 59.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 59-60.
24. 342 U.S. 359 (1952). Here, a railroad worker sued under the Federal Employer's
Liability Act (FELA), current version at 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1982), alleging negligence on the
part of his employer. The railroad claimed as a defense a written release. Id. at 360. Although the employee claimed fraud in the inducement, the Ohio Supreme Court applied
state law and found for the employer. Id. at 360-61. The United States Supreme Court
reversed, holding that state law did not govern defenses in cases involving federal rights.
The possibility of defeat of federal rights by defenses governed by state law and the need
for uniformity in FELA cases required the application of federal law, according to the
Court. Id. at 361.
25. Seredinski, 776 F.2d at 60. The court stated that Title VII and the ADEA were
similar to FELA in the frequency of settlements, the need for uniformity and the possibility
of the defeat of federal rights by the application of state law to settlement. Id. at 59-60.
Thus, the rationale of Dice, 342 U.S. 359, could apply here. In support, the court cites a case
which applies the rationale of Dice to an ADEA settlement agreement, Ott v. Midland-Ross
Corp., 523 F.2d 1367 (6th Cir. 1975). 776 F.2d at 60.
26. In dismissing Seredinski's fraudulent inducement claim as a state claim involving
interpretation of a contract, the district court relied on Weills v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 553
F. Supp. 640 (N.D. Cal. 1982)(cited at 776 F.2d at 59). The Weills court held that enforcement of a settlement contract which arose out of a Title VII claim involved only state law
and no federal question. The court reasoned that the dispute involved neither interpretation
of a federal statute nor the enforcement of a federally created right, but rather, the interpretation of a contract. 553 F.Supp. 640.
27. Id. at 60-61.
28. 404 U.S. 522 (1972).
29. A deferral state is one having a state or local antidiscrimination law and a state or
local agency with the power to "grant or seek relief" from practices prohibited under Title
VII. Seredinski, 776 F.2d at 61. (This also applies to the ADEA.)

174
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Pennsylvania. 0
As the Third Circuit observed, although the deadline for filing a
Title VII complaint with the EEOC in a deferral state is 300
days,31 the standard of Mohasco Corp. v. Silver32 applies. A deferral state complainant must file with the EEOC within 240 days of
the alleged discriminatory act to be certain of timeliness since the
state agency is allowed sixty" of the 300 days to act on the complaint.34 Seredinski filed on the 280th day and PHRC proceedings
were not terminated prior to the 300th day.38 According to the
court, neither the EEOC regulation permitting filing within 300
days,3 6 nor the 1982 Worksharing Agreement between the EEOC
and PHRC eliminates the need to file within 240 days in a deferral
state.37 Thus, the Third Circuit held that Seredinski's Title VII
retaliation claim was time-barred.38
However, the court held that the ADEA retaliation claim was
not time-barred. The standard of Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans9
30. Id.
31. Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d), provides in pertinent part:
A charge under this section shall be filed within one hundred and eighty days after
the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred . . . except that in the case of an
unlawful employment practice with respect to which the person aggrieved has initially instituted proceedings with a State or local agency with authority to grant or
seek relief from such practice . . . such charge shall be filed by or on behalf of the
person aggrieved within three hundred days after the alleged unlawful employment
practice occurred, or within thirty days after receiving notice that the State or local
agency has terminated the proceedings under the State or local law, whichever is earlier.
Id.
32. 447 U.S. 807 (1980). This case defined the date of "filing" with the EEOC as the
date when either the sixty-day deferral period under Title VII (see n.33, below) had run or
the state agency had terminated proceedings, whichever should occur earlier. Id. at 813-19.
Thus, only by filing on or before the 240th day after the discriminatory act may a person
ensure that a Title VII charge will be considered timely filed with the EEOC. Id.
33. Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) provides in pertinent part: "[N]o charge may be
filed... [with the EEOC] by the person aggrieved before the expiration of sixty days after
proceedings have been commenced under the State or local law, unless such proceedings
have been earlier terminated . . ." Id.
34. Seredinski, 776 F.2d at 61.
35. Id. at 61 n.7 and n.8.
36. Id. at 61-62 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13 (a)(3)(1985)).
37. 776 F.2d at 62. The state agency must be afforded the opportunity either to process the discrimination charge or to waive deferral. Id.
38. Id. at 61-63.
39. 441 U.S. 750 (1979). The Court held that although a complainant must institute
proceedings with the state agency in a deferral staie, this need not be done within state
mandated time limits. Id. at 759. The Court pointed out that, under the ADEA, the charge
can be filed with the EEOC at the same time as it is filed with the state agency and need
not be delayed for sixty days. Id. at 756-57.
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applies in this case. Under the ADEA, the complainant may file an
age discrimination complaint with the state agency and the EEOC
simultaneously. 40 As such, any ADEA complaint filed with the
EEOC within 300 days is timely.4 1 Even so, the ADEA complainant
is not thereby excused from filing with the state agency. 42 Judge
Higginbotham concluded that the submission of an age discrimination complaint to the EEOC is not delayed by the sixty-day period
of deferral to the state under the ADEA; 41 rather, the complainant
is kept out of court until the state agency has had sixty days to
conduct its proceedings.44
In addition to Judge Higginbotham's majority opinion, Judge
Sarokin filed a concurring opinion, in which he concurred with the
majority as to the settlement agreement and the ADEA claim, but
disagreed as to the untimeliness of the Title VII claim. 45 According
to Judge Sarokin, equitable tolling should have been applied due
to the EEOC's failure to follow its own procedures.4 6 Had the
EEOC filed the complaint with the PHRC, it was possible that the
state agency would have terminated its proceedings within the 300day limit even though Seredinski did not file with the EEOC until
the 280th day.47 Stating that a summary judgment standard was
applicable and that the facts should have been viewed in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff, Judge Sarokin would have applied
the doctrine of equitable tolling in order to effect a consideration
of the Title VII retaliation complaint on its merits. 8
40. Seredinaki, 776 F.2d at 63.
41. The ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 626(d), sets up a 180-day deadline for filing with the
EEOC in nondeferral states and a 300-day deadline in deferral states. These deadlines are
much like those set forth in Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d). See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
42. 776 F.2d at 63.
43. The ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 633(b), provides in pertinent part:
In the case of an alleged unlawful practice occurring in a State which has a law
prohibiting discrimination in employment because of age and establishing or authorizing a State authority to grant or seek relief from such discriminatory practice no
suit may be brought . . . before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have
been commenced under the State law, unless such proceedings have been earlier terminated . . .

Id.
44. 776 F.2d at 63.
45. Id.
46. The majority assumes that the complaint was filed with the PHRC by the EEOC.
Id. at 63 n.11.
47. Id. at 64. It is unclear whether the complaint was filed with the PHRC. The majority assumes that it was, while Judge Sarokin assumes that it was not. Judge Sarokin's assumption supports his equitable tolling argument. Id.
48. Id. at 64-65.
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It is evident from this discussion that the opinion in Seredinski
consists largely of statutory interpretation. In the field of employment discrimination, the disposition of a case has often depended
on a court's interpretation of the time limits under Title VII or the
ADEA. Judicial construction of these time limits has evolved since
the two statutes were passed in the 1960's. Seredinski represents
the present state of judicial interpretation in this area. Thus, to
evaluate the majority opinion in Seredinski, one must look at legislative and judicial history of these two statutes.
The Civil Rights Act of 1964, passed three years before the
ADEA, was a product of the civil rights movement of the late
1950's and early 1960's.49 The statute was passed in a climate of
burgeoning awareness of the racial, religious and ethnic inequalities then present in American society. The broad remedial purpose
of the statute was stated in the Senate report: " . . . to achieve a
peaceful and voluntary settlement of the persistent problem of racial and religious discrimination or segregation . . ., Ironically, in
view of its application to sex discrimination in Seredinski, the statute was aimed primarily at racial discrimination. Sex discrimina5
tion was added to Title VII as an afterthought. 1
49. See, e.g., 110 Cong. Rec. 8243-8245 (1964)(remarks of Senator Javits). In his
speech of April 17, 1964, Senator Javits related the civil rights demonstrations of the early
1960's to the need for a civil rights law:
Demonstrations are large and significant because a large and significant number of
people hold deep-seated grievances, and it is because there is no other legally sanctioned redress for those grievances that they must demonstrate to call attention to
the need for law.
The Department of Justice has provided statistics. . . which indicate that the frequency of racial demonstrations of all types is markedly lower in States which have
antidiscrimination laws.... From May 1963 to April 1964 a total of 2,422 racial
demonstrations have occurred in the United States, 990 of which occurred in Northern States and 1,432 in the 17 Southern and border States.
Id. at 8243.
50. S. Rep. No. 872, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprintedin 1964 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 2355, 2355 (cited in Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. at 818 n.23).
51. See 110 Cong. Rec. 2577 (1964). The prohibition on sex discrimination was added
as an amendment to Title VII of the civil rights bill by Representative Howard W. Smith of
Virginia on February 8, 1964. Id. It is generally accepted that his amendment was a joke,
intended to ridicule the antidiscrimination measure and ensure its defeat. Id. at 2578 (remarks of Rep. Celler). Probably to Mr. Smith's great surprise, the amendment gained acceptance and was enacted. Id. at 2577-2584. The tone of Mr. Smith's remarks is interesting:
[T]his amendment is offered to the fair employment practices title of this bill to
include within our desire to prevent discrimination against another minority group,
the women, but a very essential minority group. . .. in the absence of which the
majority group would not be here today.
Now, I am very serious about this amendment. ..
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Necessarily, the Civil Rights Act must be viewed as a whole, as
one statute prohibiting several forms of discrimination. The broad
remedial purpose of the statute animates the whole, such that the
stringent filing requirements contained in Title VII are anomalous.
Yet these time limits, which bar many legitimate claims, were originally more stringent.52 Title VII, as originally enacted, required a
charge to be filed with the EEOC within ninety days of the alleged
discrimination in nondeferral states and within 210 days in deferral states. 53
In Mohasco Corp. v. Silver,54 the Supreme Court discussed the
rationale for the Title VII filing deadlines." The deadlines in Title
VII arose out of the compromise bill." Congress intended to eliminate stale claims, yet still allow states to resolve discrimination
complaints. 57 The longer deferral state deadlines permitted state
agencies to process complaints, while preserving complainants' federal rights. Of course, any complaints resolved by state agencies
would not enter the crowded federal courts.58 It is thus evident
that there are policy reasons for the Title VII deadlines. In interpreting Title VII, the courts must respect this legislative intent.
Courts considering employment discrimination cases have faced
the difficult task of balancing the remedial purpose of Title VII
against the policies implicit in its deadlines. The Supreme Court
confronted this problem in Love v. Pullman,59 one of the earlier

[T]o show you how some of the ladies feel about discrimination against them, I want
to read you an extract from a letter that I received the other day...
I suggest that you might also favor an amendment or a bill to correct the present
"imbalance" which exists between males and females in the United States ... Just
why the Creator would set up such an imbalance of spinsters, shutting off the "right"
of every female to have a husband of her own, is, of course, known only to nature...
But I am sure you will agree that this is a grave injustice to womankind and something the Congress and President Johnson should take immediate steps to correct
Id. at 2577.
52. 447 U.S. at 820-21.
53. Id. at 820 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d) (1964)). After the 1972 Amendments
added a section to Title VII, § 2000e-5(d) became § 2000e-5(e). Id. The current version of
this section of Title VII, containing the longer time limit of 180 days in nondeferral states
and 300 days in deferral states, may be found at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1982).
54. 447 U.S. at 807.
55. Id. at 820-22.
56. Id. at 819-20 (citing 110 Cong. Rec. 12593-12594 (1964)).
57. Id. at 820-21.
58. Id. at 821-22.
59. 404 U.S. 522 (1972). This case involved a black "porter-in-charge" who was paid
less than white conductors who did the same work. He filed with the EEOC on May 23,

178

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 25:171

Title VII cases. A lower court had dismissed a discrimination complaint because the EEOC, rather than the complainant, had filed
the charge with the state agency.6 0 Noting that the EEOC's filing
met the intent of Title VII, the Supreme Court rejected the lower
court's narrow reading of the statute. The Court found "[s]uch
technicalities . . . [to be] particularly inappropriate in a statutory
scheme in which laymen, unassisted by trained lawyers initiate the
process. ' ''
In Mohasco Corp. v. Silver," the Court again addressed the interpretation of the Title VII deadlines. The Court considered the
longer deadlines enacted in 1972,3 those being 180 days in
nondeferral states and 300 days in deferral states, " and set forth
an entirely new rule as to the effect of deferral to a state agency.6 5
In Mohasco, the question before the Court was whether the complaint was time-barred. 6 The majority opinion, written by Justice
Stevens, was based on the meaning of the word "filed" in Title
VII. 67 The Court held that a Title VII complaint is not "filed" with
the EEOC until sixty days after deferral to the state, unless state
proceedings terminate earlier.6 The sixty-day state processing period must occur within the 300-day time limit. 9 Because Silver
submitted his complaint to the EEOC on the 291st day after the
alleged discrimination, and state proceedings did not terminate by
the 300th day, Silver's complaint was held to be untimely filed. 0
Thus arose what Justice Blackmun, in his dissenting opinion,
called the "240-day maybe" rule: if a complainant files with the
EEOC beyond the 240th day in a deferral state, maybe the com71
plaint will be timely.
In justifying the 240-day rule, Justice Stevens pointed out that a
1966. Id. at 523.
60. Id. at 524-25.
61. Id. at 525-27.
62. 447 U.S. 807 (1980). The complainant, Silver, submitted a complaint to the EEOC
which charged religious discrimination in employment. He did not submit the complaint
until 291 days after the alleged discriminatory act. The EEOC deferred the complaint and
the State did not finish processing it within sixty days. Thus arose the controversy over
when a complaint is "filed". Id.
63. Id. at 822.
64. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d)(1982). See supra note 31.
65. 447 U.S. at 826-27.
66. Id. at 812-15.
67. Id. at 815-18.
68. Id. at 817.
69. Id. at 825-26.
70. Id. at 817.
71. Id. at 833-35.
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deferral state complainant is under the same obligation to proceed
diligently as any other complainant.7 2 The longer time limit in
deferral states was created to allow deferral, not to allow some
complainants to sit on their rights. 73 Thus, the Mohasco Court
concluded that there was no unfairness in requiring complainants
to file Title VII discrimination complaints in time to allow state
processing within the 300-day time limit.
The importance of Mohasco is that it established a clear Title
VII filing deadline in deferral states. Complainants may now rely
on the 240-day rule. The Court made clear in Mohasco that restrictions not found in Title VII would not be applied. Thus, the Court
rejected the idea that deferral state complainants must file Title
VII complaints with the state agency within 180 days.7" In
Mohasco, the Supreme Court carried out the legislative intent
manifested in the deadlines, but still carried forward the principle
of liberal construction.
Even if a deadline is interpreted liberally, its application will
sometimes produce harsh results. This would occur when a complainant was prevented from timely filing. Thus, it was necessary
to determine whether Title VII deadlines are jurisdictional. In
Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,7 the Supreme Court held that
Title VII deadlines are of the nature of a statute of limitations,
and not jurisdictional. Therefore, for sufficient cause, courts may
apply the doctrines of equitable tolling, estoppel and waiver. 76
Complainants prevented from timely filing through no fault of
their own are not kept out of court.
A Third Circuit case which followed Zipes, Kocian v. Getty Re72. Id. at 821.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 816-17. It should be noted that some courts had previously held that a complainant was required to file with the state agency within 180 days in a deferral state. See,
e.g., Olson v. Rembrandt Printing Co., 511 F.2d 1228 (8th Cir. 1975) (in which a sex discrimination complaint under Title VII was dismissed because a charge had not been filed with
the state agency within 180 days).
75. 455 U.S. 385 (1982). This Title VII class action suit was brought by female flight
attendants subject to an airline rule requiring that their employment be terminated when
they became mothers. There was no similar rule for male employees who became fathers. Id.
at 388. The question which arose was whether the courts had jurisdiction over class members who had not timely filed with the EEOC, for purposes of a settlement. Id. at 388-92.
The court held that Title VII time limits were not jurisdictional, but in the nature of a
statute of limitations. Id. at 394-95. Thus, the courts had jurisdiction over class members
who had filed late. Id. at 396-97. Also, equitable tolling, waiver and estoppel could be applied to the Title VII deadlines. Id. at 393.
76. Id. at 393.
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fining Co. 7 set out the reasons for the application of equitable tolling in a Title VII case. In Kocian, it was determined that if the
employer actively misled a complainant, if the complainant was
prevented from filing in some extraordinary manner, or if the complainant filed in time, although in the wrong forum, equitable tolling would be appropriate. Thus, complainants are not penalized
for matters beyond their control. On the same basis, other courts
have utilized the doctrine of equitable tolling in cases where EEOC
errors prevented complainants from filing on time.
It is thus apparent that judicial interpretations of the Title VII
deadlines have been tempered by equitable considerations. While
respecting the intent of Congress as manifested in these deadlines,
courts have attempted to carry out the remedial purpose of Title
VII.
There are many parallels between Title VII and ADEA. The two
statutes are similar both in purpose and in their treatment by the
courts. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act, like Title VII,
is a broad remedial measure aimed at employment discrimination.
The ADEA was passed only three years after the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, by a Congress already sensitized to the problems caused
by discrimination.7 9 To illustrate these problems, the House Report quotes a January 23, 1967 speech by President Johnson:
"Hundreds of thousands, not yet old, not yet voluntarily retired,
find themselves jobless because of arbitrary age discrimination...
they comprise 27 percent of all the unemployed and 40 percent of
the long-term unemployed."8 0 The intent behind the ADEA is also
made apparent in the House Report: "[T]o promote the employment of older workers based on their ability. 8 1 As Title VII and
the ADEA were two anti-discrimination measures passed within a
few years of each other, it was inevitable that courts would interpret the two statutes similarly.82 In Davis v. Calgon Corp.,s the
77. 707 F.2d 748 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 852 (1983).
78. See, e.g., Williams v. Owens-Illinois Corp., 665 F.2d 918 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 97 (1982) (no penalty to Title VII complainant due to EEOC's failure to defer
to the state); Jennings v. American Postal Workers Union, 672 F.2d 712 (8th Cir.
1982)(complainant kept from filing because EEOC mistakenly told her that it lacked jurisdiction over her complaint was held to have timely filed).
79. See H.R. Rep. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1967 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 2213.
80. Id. at 2214 (citing President Johnson's Older American Message of January 23,
1967).
81. H. R. Rep. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1967 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 2213, 2214.
82. This is especially true since the EEOC currently enforces both Title VII and the
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Third Circuit endorsed parallel interpretations of the two statutes
as to their similar 180-day and 300-day filing deadlines.84 Adopting
the reasoning of Mohasco Corp. v. Silver,8 5 the court held that
there is no 180-day time limit for filing with a state agency." The
Davis,Court 7 also applied the general philosophy of Love v. Pullman"8 to ADEA cases, thereby rejecting an overly strict reading of
the statute.
There are other similarities in judicial interpretation of Title VII
and the ADEA. For example, in Bonham v. Dresser Indus.,89 it was
determined that ADEA deadlines, like Title VII deadlines, are not
jurisdictional. Therefore, the doctrines of equitable tolling, waiver
and estoppel can be applied in ADEA cases.9 0 It is evident that in
ADEA cases, as in Title VII cases, courts have attempted to reconcile the filing deadlines with the remedial intent of the statute.
In drafting a statute prohibiting age discrimination in employment, it is logical that Congress would follow the pattern of another statute prohibiting employment discrimination. The ADEA
deadlines were patterned after the Title VII deadlines, as the Supreme Court informed us in Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans."1 However, the ADEA deadlines are different in one important respect:
Title VII requires that a charge be deferred to the state for sixty
ADEA. ADEA enforcement powers were transferred from the Secretary of Labor to the
EEOC in 1978 by Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978, § 2, 3 C.F.R. 321 (1979), 43 Fed. Reg.
19807 (1979).
83. 627 F.2d 674 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1101 (1981), reh'g denied, 450
U.S. 971 (1981).
84. Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d) (1982); ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1982). See
supra notes 31 and 41 and accompanying text.
85. 447 U.S. 807 (1980).
86. Davis, 627 F.2d at 676.
87. Id.
88. 404 U.S. 522 (1972).
89. 569 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978).
90. See, e.g., Meyer v. Riegel Products Corp., 720 F.2d 303 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 465 U.S. 1091 (1984)(ADEA complainant had reason to know of discrimination, but
deadline was tolled because employer misrepresented the reason for dismissal). Cutright v.
General Motors Corp., 486 F. Supp. 590 (W.D. Pa. 1980), sets forth the reasons for applying
equitable tolling in an ADEA case. The doctrine of equitable tolling will apply where the
complainant was not informed of his rights under the law, where he was misled, or where he
was not immediately aware of the discriminatory act.
91. 441 U.S. 750 (1979). The Court also held that, while a charge must be filed with
the state agency in a deferral state, this need not be done within the state statute of limitations. Id. at 759. See also Shaffer v. Nat'l Can Corp., 565 F. Supp. 909 (E.D. Pa. 1983)
(applying this holding to Title VII disputes). As to both simultaneous filing and state deadlines, the legislative history of the ADEA supports the Court's decision in Oscar Mayer. See
S. Rep. No. 493, 95th' Cong., 2d Sess. 5-7, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News,
504, 508-10.
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days92 before it is considered as filed with the EEOC. The ADEA
contains no such requirement for filing in deferral states. 93 Thus,
as the Court explained in Oscar Mayer,94 the ADEA complainant
in a deferral state may file simultaneously with the state agency
and the EEOC. The ADEA deadline was structured in this fashion
because Congress determined that delays in the processing of complaints would be particularly prejudicial to older persons."
Thus, under the ADEA, the sixty-day state processing period
does not delay filing with the EEOC. Rather, the deferral period
only delays the complainant's access to the federal courts.9
It is evident that the Title VII and ADEA deadlines have generated a number of cases. Much of the judicial interpretation of
these statutes is incorporated in Seredinski v. Clifton Precision
Products.9 7 Judge Higginbotham's opinion 8 makes clear the difference between Title VII and the ADEA in deferral states, clearly
distinguishing between the 240-day rule of Mohasco99 and the simultaneous filing rule of Oscar Mayer.100
The distinction which the Third Circuit makes is not an obvious
one. A comparison of the language of the ADEA10 ' with that of
Title VII does not clearly bring out the difference in statutory
deadlines. It is easy for a court to misinterpret these deadlines and
hold that they are identical.
The confusion inherent in the statutory deadlines is exacerbated
by a highly ambiguous EEOC regulation which gives both ADEA
10 2
and Title VII complainants 300 days to file with the EEOC.
Judge Higginbotham's opinion shows us the proper interpretation
of this regulation. The intent of the EEOC in drafting the regulation was merely to codify one of the holdings of Oscar Mayer,"'3
that complainants need not file with state agencies within state
time limits. 10 4 Thus, the Seredinski opinion upholds the 240-day
92. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1982). See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
93. 29 U.S.C. § 633(b) (1982). See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
94. 441 U.S. at 756.
95. Id. at 757 (citing 113 Cong. Rec. 7076 (1967), remarks of Sen. Javits).
96. 29 U.S.C. § 633(b). See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
97. 776 F.2d 56.
98. Id. at 61-63.
99. 447 U.S. 807.
100. 441 U.S. 750.
101. 29 U.S.C. § 633(b). See supra note 43 and accompanying text. Compare 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(c). See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
102. 776 F.2d at 61-62 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1601. 13(a)(3) (1985)).
103. 441 U.S. 750.
104. Id. at 759.
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rule for Title VII complainants.1 0 5
A further source of confusion is eliminated when Judge Higginbotham explains the effect of the PHRC-EEOC Worksharing
Agreement on the Title VII deadlines. Rather than eliminating the
deferral requirement, the agreement merely allows the PHRC to
waive deferral.106
By sorting out the various decisions, regulations and agreements
applicable in Title VII and ADEA cases, the court in Seredinski
brings clarity to a field of law which is sadly in need of it. Such a
clarifying opinion is valuable, even if it is not novel.
However, the majority opinion in Seredinski is not devoid of
novelty. The court's approach to the question of fraud in the settlement agreement is an unusual approach in a discrimination
10 7
case. Since Title VII and ADEA deadlines are not jurisdictional,
the doctrine of equitable tolling could have been applied here. The
court could have held that Seredinski's claims relating to her demotion would be considered as timely if Clifton had fraudulently
induced Seredinski to sign the settlement agreement. Such an approach would have been expected of a court considering a discrimination case.
Instead, the court chose to consider the question of fraud in the
settlement agreement as an Erie'0 s question. Relying on Dice v.
Akron, Canton and Youngstown R.R.,10 9 a venerable case involving
fraud in an FELA release, the court determined that fraud in a
release of federal rights is a federal question." 0 The case of Ott v.
Midland-Ross Corp.,
which also relied on Dice, was used for
support. However, Ott"2 was decided at a time when the Title VII
and ADEA deadlines were still held to be jurisdictional. Thus, the
105. 776 F.2d at 62.
106. Id.
107. See supra notes 75 and 89 and accompanying text.
108. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). This landmark case determined
that state law, not federal common law, shall apply in diversity cases. It generated numerous
other cases, as courts attempted to determine where federal law applied and where state law
applied.
109. 342 U.S. 359. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
1
110. 776 F.2d at 60.
111. 523 F.2d 1367 (6th Cir. 1975). An employee was discharged due to age. The employer induced him to take early retirement and waive his ADEA rights by offering the
employee a lucrative consulting contract. The employer then breached the contract. Id. at
1368. The district court dismissed based on the waiver. Although it considered ADEA deadlines to be jurisdictional, the Sixth Circuit held that the employer was estopped from asserting the settlement agreement if there was fraud in the inducement. Id.
112. Id. at 1370.
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doctrine of equitable tolling was not as readily available to the
Court in Ott. However, even Ott involves equitable considerations.
The Seredinski opinion seems to avoid the use of the court's equity powers entirely.
Regardless of its approach, the Third Circuit has chosen to open
the door for discrimination complainants who seek to void settlement agreements. Here, too, is a way to reach the merits of the
case where a claim is time-barred.
It may seem odd that Judge Higginbotham did not apply equitable tolling to Seredinski's Title VII retaliation complaint. In his
concurring opinion, Judge Sarokin argued that equitable tolling
should have been applied due to the EEOC's failure to defer the
complaint to the state agency. 113 The majority chose to assume
that the complaint had been deferred." 4 Therefore, the majority
found that the complaint was untimely, because it was filed with
the state on the 280th day and state proceedings did not terminate
by the 300th day."'
Since it was unclear whether Seredinski's complaint was ever deferred to the state,"' the court had a choice of several assumptions. By assuming deferral on the 280th day, the court kept the
Title VII retaliation complaint from being heard on its merits. Arguably, this approach represents the court's unwillingness to apply
equitable doctrines. However, there are other possible reasons for
such an approach.
Judge Higginbotham's opinion manifests a respect for the legislative policy behind the Title VII deadlines, as interpreted in
Mohasco. 17 In balancing a strong legislative policy against the
rights of a complainant who waited until the 280th day to submit a
complaint to the EEOC, the court chose not to waive the Title VII
deadline.
Discrimination law is procedurally difficult, partly because of the
statutory deadlines discussed here. Traps for the unwary are present. The courts can only point out the traps and chart a way
around them.
An important question arises as to whether discrimination law
should be so procedurally difficult. The complainant who misinterprets the deadlines and files late has no recourse. Anomalies occur,
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

776 F.2d at 64.
Id. at 58, 61-62.
Id. at 61-62.
Id. at 61.
447 U.S. 807.
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as where Louise Seredinski, with two claims arising from the same
discriminatory acts, finds that one of them is time-barred. Thus,
under these two remedial statutes, many persons who suffered
harm due to discrimination can find themselves without a remedy.
Certainly, Congress enacted Title VII and the ADEA with stringent time limits for filing complaints as a way of balancing the interests of the discrimination complainant against society's interest
in eliminating stale claims. 18 Still, the procedural labyrinth which
now exists could hardly be seen as comporting with the intent of
Congress. Even those who accept the necessity of stringent deadlines cannot justify the confusion attendant on ambiguous
deadlines.
Only Congress can change the statutory deadlines under Title
VII and the ADEA. Until these deadlines are changed or made less
ambiguous, complainants can only rely on the courts to show them
how to proceed. The Third Circuit has done this in Seredinski.
Carolyn Corr3

118.

Id. at 820.

